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Hall: Civilizational Change: The Role of Nomads

CIVILIZATIONAL CHANGE:
THE ROLE OF NOMADS 1

T H O M A S D. H A L L
Unless you let us b a r t e r w h e n e v e r we come, we will start killing
again! response of a n a n g r y T a n g u t to a closed fair-place
(Szynkiewicz 1989, p. 157)

Introduction

Recently William McNeill in a thoughtful autocritique of The
Rise of the West said:
. . . the central methodological weakness of my book is that while it e m phasizes interaction across civilizational b o u n d a r i e s , it pays i n a d e q u a t e
attention to the e m e r g e n c e of the ecumenical world system within which
we live t o d a y . . . . S o m e h o w a n appreciation of the a u t o n o m y of separate
civilizations (and of all the o t h e r less massive a n d less skilled cultures of
the e a r t h ) across the past two t h o u s a n d years n e e d s to be c o m b i n e d with
the portrait of a n e m e r g i n g world system, connecting g r e a t e r a n d
g r e a t e r n u m b e r s of persons across civilized b o u n d a r i e s (McNeill 1990,
p p . 9-10).

T h e emergence of this "ecumenical world system" is both real and
problematic, as is the methodology to study it. McNeill's parenthetical remarks allude to an issue raised at length by Eric Wolf
(1982), namely that constant attention to state level societies, or
"civilizations" in one of the many meanings of that term. This
neglect has led to the neglect of the roles played by nonstate
peoples in history.
Nomads, in particular, have suffered from such neglect. They
are seen as "barbarians," and therefore "beyond the pale" both
socially and intellectually. This attitude is harmful, not only because it is "bad taste" in these days of cultural pluralism, but also
because it leads to systematic misunderstanding of processes of
civilizational change. This is so for several reasons. First, it appears that sedentary social organizadon emerged from an entirely nomadic context (Nissen 1988). In other words, civilization
arose from nomads originally. Second, nomadic groups fre34
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quently play complex intermediary roles in the interactions
among sedentary groups, especially states and civilizations. For
instance, the rise and fall of the Mongol Empire played a major
role in the collapse of the eastern circuits of the thirteenth century
Eurasian world-system, yet the Mongols were exceptional in
many ways to typical nomad-sedentary relations (Barfield 1989).
Third, our "modern world-system" was "restructured from" the
remains of the earlier Eurasian world-system (Abu-Lughod 1989,
1990). Hence, the role of nomads in such restructuring must be
understood in order to understand origins of our world and past
successions of civilizations. T o do this it is useful to refine the
language of discourse.
Conceptual and Theoretical Terms
"World-Systems" and "Core/Periphery Hierarchies"
Two concepts and their theoretical roots are central to this
somewhat complicated argument: "world-system" and "core/
periphery hierarchy." A "world-system," according to Immanuel
Wallerstein, is a systematically linked interstate system composed
of core, peripheral, and semiperipheral states. 2 He calls this a
"world" system because it is a self-contained division of labor, in
short, a world. If the system is dominated by a central political
actor, he calls it a "world-empire." If there is no central political
actor, but several competing states interconnected by trade, he
calls it a "world-economy." Core states are developed countries;
peripheral states are un- or under- developed countries; and
semiperipheral states have some characteristics of the other two
types, and generally block polarization between core and
periphery. Core development is fueled by exploitation of
peripheral states. This exploitation is necessary for core development, and a major cause of peripheral underdevelopment.
Semiperipheral states have a relationship to peripheral states that
is similar to that between core and periphery, and they have a
relationship to core states that is similar to that between periphery
and core. Thus, they have a stake in maintaining the overall system, although their attempts to improve their position within the
system sometimes lead to significant changes in it. 3
World-system theory was developed to explain the rise, and in
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol24/iss24/5
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some versions the eventual demise, of the "modern worldsystem," that is, the interstate system that developed in western
Europe in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and which subsequently came to dominate the entire globe. This theory has
generated both a good deal of new knowledge and a tremendous
amount of controversy in several disciplines. 4 Two of these controversies are relevant here. First, although in principle worldsystem theory should pay attention to the relations between state
and nonstate societies, especialy how interaction with and incorporation into the world-system has transformed the course of
social change in nonstate societies, in practice it has not done so
(Wolf 1982; Hall 1986, 1989). Second, deriving from both a concern with origins of the modern world-system and with its complex relations with nonstate societies, questions arise as to the
generalizability of the theory to settings prior to the fifteenth
century, that is to "precapitalist" settings.
The extension of world-system theory to "precapitalist" settings necessarily raises questions about the distinctiveness of the
"modern world-system" with respect to "precapitalist" worldsystems.5 First, there is no reason, a priori, to require that every
world-system have a semiperiphery, or that it be limited to only
one tier between core and periphery. The extent of the hierarchy
should remain an empirial problem. Second, the precise boundaries of nonstate societies (especially nomadic societies) are
theoretically and empirically problematic. On the one hand,
nonstate societies—based on contemporary ethnographic studies
and ethnohistory—do not have precise borders, but tend to "fade
away" in decreasingly important kin relationships and other connections (Wolf 1982). On the other hand, just how much and what
type of interaction between state and nonstate societies constitutes a significant connection also remains problematic. Trade in
vital goods, trade in luxuries, 6 trade in captives, alliances for frontier buffering, recruitment of nomads for armies, or endemic
warfare with other nomads probably have different implications
for the historical evolution of core/periphery hierarchies. Third,
that which is evolving is not a self-contained social unit, such as a
"tribe," a "state," an "empire," or a "civilization," but a larger unit,
some type of "world-system" which has been labeled a core/
periphery hierarchy (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1991a, 1991b).7
Within this broad framework, then, the problem is to examine
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1991
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the role of nomads in the historical evolution of core/periphery
hierarchies. I use the term "historical evolution" to denote a process subject to systematic explanation, one that can be explained,
not by reference to abstract categories or teleological processes,
but by examination of historical events. I explicitly reject all unilinear analyses. Even within such an openended and historically
contingent approach to social change the origins of states, and of
core/periphery hierarchies are germane to this discussion.

The Origins of States, Trade, Nomads, and Technology
In a discussion of the contributions of archaeology to understanding the origin of the state, Gledhill claims:
A regional focus seems of crucial importance . . . T h e 'nuclear areas' of
ancient civilization were also characterized by intense interactions between nomadic and sedentary populations, interactions which linked
farms to fishermen, gatherer-hunters and pastoralists" (Gledhill 1988, p.
23).

In other words, states, and hence civilizations, originated in systems of intersocietal interaction. Kohl argues that:
. . . even the earliest "pristine" example of state formation cannot be
explained entirely as an internal process of social differentiation but
must be viewed pardy as the product of a "world-economy" at different
levels of development . . . (Kohl 1978, p. 489).

T h e evidence, as is always the case with archaeological materials,
is incomplete, and subject to revision based on new finds,
nevertheless, the evidence is very persuasive. Trade between lowland Mesopotamia and highland Iranian plateau supplied goods
used by state officials to support their claims to authority and
legitimacy. The trade induced mutual dependency between the
two areas, and constituted a world-system.
Kohl urges his archaeologist colleagues "to stop dismantling
our tents and stealing away before history dawns," (1978, p. 475)
and to make full use of information available in the historical
record using evidence on such things as:
. . . qualitatively novel developments in transportation, communication,
and military technology associated with the domestication of the horse;
the appearance of effective chariots; the spread or "democratization" of
metal tools and weapons . . . (Kohl 1988, p. 30).

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol24/iss24/5
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In other words, archaeologists should use historical materials in
their quest to understand and explain these developments which
occurred over long periods which usually straddled the boundary
between prehistory and history.
Anthony (1986) points out that the domestication of horses
greatly enhanced transportation and communication over land.
Since simple iron making technology was very portable it could
diffuse easily among horse riding nomads (Kohl 1987a, p. 22).
With knowledge of iron making and possession of sizable horse
herds it becomes readily apparent how nomads could sometimes
dominate sedentary peoples, and how they may have been the
originators of technological innovations. This could lead to an
interesting situation where the "periphery" dominated the
"core." If one adheres strictly to Wallerstein's definitions, this is
logically impossible because his definition of core includes domination of the periphery. If, however, one uses core/periphery
hierarchy and makes domination an empirical issue, reversal is
possible. This then allows empirical investigation into the origins
of the modern pattern in which the core always dominates the
periphery.
Rather than pursue abstract discussions of these issues and
problems, it is appropriate to turn to historical examples of
nomad-sedentary interactions.
Nomad-Civilization

Relations

China and Nomads
T h e importance of nomads in Chinese history is widely acknowledged. 8 This account stresses only certain processes, drawing heavily from the work of Owen Lattimore and Thomas Barfield. Throughout early Chinese history agriculturalists who had
moved to the steppe sometimes adopted other styles of making a
living (e.g., herding) that were better suited to the local ecology.
This pastoralism was not a case of "devolution," but an alternative
survival strategy (Lattimore 1980). Thus, the nomad-sedentary
distinction is fundamentally one of livelihood, not race or ethnicity. That is, the difference between lifestyles remains, even
though individuals may change from one to the other.
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1991
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Since nomads produced little of interest or value to settled
Chinese, nomads used threats of force to induce trade: trading
and raiding were alternative means to the same ends. Sedentary
Chinese eventually developed a cavalry to fight nomads. Indeed,
some studies show that raiding correlated with changing conditions of trade and changing state stability (Szynkiewicz 1989, p.
154; Barfield 1989). Chinese officials acquiesced to this trade as a
way of controlling nomads. The trade was primarily in luxury
goods used by nomadic leaders to shore up and symbolize their
power. This interaction fueled changes both in China and among
nomads. It helped in incorporating new lands. In times of state
decline, nomadic leaders sometimes served as protectors of beleaguered areas. In times of state ascendance, unified Chinese
response promoted wider unity among nomads. Nomads were as
often a source of change as a receiver (Lattimore 1980, Barfield
1989).
Barfield (1989) analyzes the interconnections between the rise
and fall of the Chinese empire and various steppe empires (see
especialy his chart p. 13). T h e two are intimately connected via the
organizational system of the Chinese empire and the varieties of
steppe politics and organization. A key feature in Barfield's
analysis is the distinction between inner and outer frontier
strategies. The outer frontier strategy is the more familiar. In this
strategy a dominant steppe leader uses violent attacks to terrify
Chinese court officials, alternates war and peace successively to
raise tribute payments, and assiduously avoids taking over
Chinese lands and the necessarily intendant entanglements in
Chinese court politics (Barfield 1989, p. 49).
The inner strategy is more subtle, and is one that develops
when a steppe confederation begins to disintegrate. Some contending steppe faction leader, typically of a weaker faction, seeks
alliance with Chinese officials against his rivals. T h e Chinese officials acquiesce, since typically they favor using "barbarians against
barbarians." T h e steppe faction leader sometimes uses the
Chinese military to aid in the defeat of his rivals and uses favor at
Chinese court to sever tribute flow between the Chinese and his
rivals. Usually, this leads to success on the part of the Chinese
allied facdon. Once dominant, the steppe leader can either use
the new power base to unify the steppe and return to an outer
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol24/iss24/5
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frontier strategy or leave the steppe politically fragmented and
seek to dominate a local region, monopolizing flow of tribute
(Barfield 1989, p. 63).
This oscillation explains the rather long cycles of nomadChinese relations (Barfield 1989, p. 13). In particular, it explains
the correlation of strong steppe polities with a strong Chinese
empire. Only when the empire is strong can it be "milked" continuously via an outer frontier strategy. When the empire is weak,
steppe leaders tend to favor an inner frontier strategy, making
alliances with local "war lords." T h e Mongols used both strategies,
but with their own peculiar twists.
T h e Mongol Empire
Analysis of the relations between Mongols and sedentary states
is doubly difficult. First, the entire Central Asian field of action
must be examined (Morgan 1986; Allsen 1987; Barfield 1989;
Kwanten 1979). This is a difficult task because of the way records
were made and preserved. The interpretation of documents—
nearly always written by and from the point of view of sedentary
state officials—requires detailed knowledge of many local histories. Second, the Mongols were peculiar in many ways as a
steppe empire (Barfield 1989). According to Abu-Lughod (1989,
1990) they played a pivotal role in the thirteenth century collapse
of the Eurasian world-system and in the consequent rise of the
European world-system.
Mongol success can be attributed to factors and processes occurring at different levels simultaneously (Sauders 1971; Morgan
1986; Lindner 1981, 1982). First, the states in western Asia were
weak and thus vulnerable to attack and conquest. Their ecological
adaptations were much more fragile. The Mongols, unaware of
this, attacked with vigor. Whereas in China destroyed towns were
rebuilt and repopulated, in southwest Asia such destruction often
became permanent, especially when irrigation systems were
ruined. Mongol refusal to take over local administration left no
one capable of rebuilding destroyed systems (Barfield 1989, pp.
201-202). This was, of course, the familiar outer frontier strategy,
but in this case applied against states which were politically
weaker and ecologically more precarious than was China.
Second, continual warfare made a client relation with the MonPublished by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1991
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gols an attractive "bargain" given the alternatives. Places which
accepted Mongol terms (Manchuria, Korea, Uighar oases) were
not destroyed and often kept their own leaders. Places which
continued to resist the Mongols or repudiated earlier treaties
(Chin China, western Turkestan, and the Tangut kingdom) were
punished and often destroyed. Chinggis was particularly intolerant of any perceived disloyalty. Punitive wars "were so devastating
that they led to the overthrow of the ruling dynasties and, by
default, their direct incorporation into the Mongol Empire" (Barfield 1989, p. 200).
The conquest of China and the founding of the Yuan dynasty
were due to an overly vigorous pursuit of the outer frontier
strategy of terror. This is one of the ways in which the Mongols
differed from all previous Central Asian nomadic groups. They
over pursued the outer frontier strategy. In the west they destroyed some states and were forced to incorporate and administer others. In the east they were ultimately trapped by their own
vigor and success into founding a new Chinese dynasty.
A third factor in Mongol success was continued presence of
pastoral nomads who maintained a flexible tribal/kin social structure which allowed them to recruit first other nomads, later even
sedentary groups, into a larger and larger machine for conquest. 9
Fourth was the presence of several leaders who were able to manage astutely the drive for conquest and plunder with the needs of
administration. 10 Specifically, Mongol leaders were able, for
some time, to maintain a sufficient volume of plunder and tribute
to insure loyalty of tribes that might otherwise be inclined to leave
the confederation. In short they perfected the outer frontier
strategy of "milking" sedentary states (with some exceptions
noted above). Fifth, superior logistic ability of pastoral nomads in
communication, transportation, and mobility was key to conquest
of large territories, and even of sedentary states. This superiority
was rooted in the pastoral way of life: availability of horses, intimate knowledge of geography, and ability to move their entire
society (families and their resource base, their herds) with them.
This same superiority was also a key to the collapse of the system.
All the great Khans—if only temporarily—have been able to
put these processes in operation {e.g., Allsen 1987). First, capitalizing on the inclusive nature of pastoral tribes, conquered groups
were given an honorable option ofjoining the group (the alternahttps://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol24/iss24/5
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tive was being put to the sword). This worked well with other
pastoralist and poorly with sedentary peoples (unless they wanted
to become pastoralists). Second, as in modern pyramid schemes,
as long as the system kept expanding, new recruits (groups) could
gain both status and wealth. Continued expansion also alleviated,
if it did not solve completely, the problem of revenue by a constant inflow of booty. As long as this was successful, it distracted
conservative elements from social changes which flowed from this
strategy and minimized factional rivalry. Superior communications and mobility were used to amass troops and overcome
enemies. However, this strategy was inherently unstable, that is,
temporary.
T h e instability stems from two closely intertwined sources:
political and technological. T h e political problem is the orderly
succession of rulers. A "big man" comes to power on the basis of
his personal skills, not the least of which is alliance-building.
Among Central Asian pastoralists, this is typically based on military prowess. Hence, succession of rulership necessarily entails
armed conflict. When there was only one son who had distinguished himself in battle, conflict was merely postponed for a
generation until either there was no sucti son, or there were several. For the Mongols these problems were exacerbated by the
competing, and at time conflicting, principles of lateral (older to
younger brothers) and lineal (father to son) succession. The lack
of clear priorities inevitably led to justification of succession by
arms. Institutionalization of succession would have undermined
the very basis of leadership. Thus, it is not only that the Mongol
Empire did not institutionalize political control as Eisenstadt
(1963) argues, but also that Mongols could not institutionalize
leadership and remain Mongols. The same problems are inherent in political control and revenue garnering.
A key to Mongol success was communication and mobility of
men and resources. These technological factors also contributed
to instability because they made it impossible for any central
leader to monopolize control of strategic resources as a means of
coercing compliance. Hence, there was no way to insure that revenue collectors would forward revenue to the leader.
T h e same features that make tribes inclusive also make them
divisive; what can be built quickly can equally quickly disintegrate.
T h e material basis of this situation is the adaptation to plains/
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1991

9

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 24 [1991], No. 24, Art. 5
Thomas D. Hall

43

steppe environment. This is the underlying limit of pastoralist
expansion. They cannot effectively control territory beyond the
plains/steppe without giving up their lifestyle, thus the edge of the
steppe remains a permanent frontier (Lindner 1982; McNeill
1964).
Conversely, sedentary states could not conquer nomads—
except by sedentarizing them. They could control them by a combination of constructing barriers and employing highly mobile
troops, who could essentially beat the pastoralists at their own
game—decisive hit-and-run victories (Lattimore 1962a, p. 485).
Thus, Central Asian pastoralists, especially the Mongols, could
build huge empires, but could not maintain them. Conversely, the
Chinese could manipulate, but never conquer, their nomadic adversaries. According to several writers (Allsen 1987; Barfield
1989; Lattimore 1951,1962d; Morgan 1986), this accounts for the
convoluted quality of Chinese histories of these events. Chroniclers had to warn princes and emperors of the inherent impossibility of conquest, while never admitting that the "son of heaven"
was not all powerful—a task that makes contemporary American
"spin doctors" appear to be rank amateurs.
T h e Ottoman Empire
The formation of the Ottoman empire is of interest because it
was built by the transformation of nomadic pastoralists into
sedentary farmer-soldiers. According to Lindner (1983), nomads,
particularly of the "tribe" of Osman, played a vital role in the
founding of the Ottoman Empire. It was precisely the fluid,
multi-cultural aspects of tribal organization that made nomadic
"tribalism" an effective model for building a state. Once built, the
needs of the new state led to the oppression and destruction of
nomads by conversion into sedentary peasants.
The erstwhile nomads, now rulers of a large state, were compelled to sedentarize the remaining nomads. This was done by first
shifting obligations of support of the state from contributions of
manpower in fighting (nomad tradition) to taxes in kind and/or
money, and later by levying taxes in early spring immediately
after lambing time, counting all animals as adult sheep, and
therefore taxable. This contrasts with the Mongol custom which
exempted small herds so that they could continue to function (p.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol24/iss24/5
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57). In other words, the goal of Ottoman tax policy was to undermine nomad economy.
Two sets of state needs impelled this policy. First, the state
rulers sought to avoid the "state within state" arrangement implied in tribal loyalty, in which the local chief administered his
tribe with considerable autonomy. This required clear tribal
boundaries, but tribal boundaries are highly permeable, membership changing with shifting economic and political conditions. 11
The second set of reasons behind sedentarization were military. As the nature of warfare changed, especially as gunpowder
came into use, the demand for mounted archers decreased, while
the demand for infantry increased. 12 Thus, nomads/>er5£ had less
to offer the state in compensation for their political administrative liabilities. Additionally, more people—and therefore more
fighting men—could be supported on the same amount of territory in a sedentary, agricultural adaptation than by nomadic
pastoralism. The volatility of pastoral production due to disease
and weather also made the greater certainty of sedentary production more desirable.
While the Ottoman Empire had clear nomadic origins, it became and remained a sedentary state which eventually destroyed
its own nomadic foundations. In contrast, the Mongol Empire
never made a successful transition to a sedentary state. The tribe
of Osman did succeed, but only by ceasing to be nomads.
Spain, America, and Los Indios Barbaros13
The comparison of Spanish and American treatments of various nomadic groups inhabiting what is now the American Southwest, what was long the northwest of New Spain, is useful in
several ways. First, the region is the same in both cases. Second,
the region was a frontier for both states—a "periphery of a
periphery" (Weber 1982). Third, America and Spain contrast a
rising capitalist state with the earliest phases of the capitalist
world-system, more akin to an empire (Cipollo 1970, Doyle 1986,
Eisenstadt 1963, 1967).14
Spanish explorers first entered the region sometime in the
1530s, slightly over a decade after Cortez conquered Mexico. T h e
region was not formally colonized until 1598. That colony colPublished by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1991
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lapsed, due to the Pueblo Revolt, in 1680, and was re-established
in the early 1690s. Thereafter it remained a tenuous, but relatively thriving colonial outpost whose fortunes waxed and waned
with those of New Spain and the Spanish Empire in general. Both
before the Pueblo Revolt, and for the half century or so after the
reconquest, the region was marked by a state of endemic warfare
with surrounding nomadic groups. In the early eighteenth century this warfare became so intense that the sedentary Pueblos,
and erstwhile ousters of the Spaniards, formed a symbiotic alliance with the Spaniards. T h e late eighteenth century was
marked by considerable local population growth and relative
prosperity. In 1786 a lasting peace was established with several
closely linked bands who became known as Comanches. 15 This
peace between Comanches and Spaniards lasted well into the
American era. The Mexican interregnum disrupted this pattern
and renewed the pattern of conflict with nomads common in the
early phases of the colony.
Throughout the Spanish era, warfare with nomadic groups
rose and fell with changes in the trade in Indian captives, with the
need for local governors to impress the viceroy with their success
in subduing "los indios barharos" or their desire for more money
and troops, and with viceregal and crown concerns for protection
of the borders of New Spain from rival European powers. It is the
latter concerns that were the driving force behind first maintenance, then refounding of the colony (Bolton 1929). These concerns likewise shaped policies toward nomadic groups, at once a
nuisance along the frontiers, yet simultaneously—especially after
the Comanche peace—a singularly effective "border patrol" for
scouting and controlling movement of European rivals.
The Bourbon reforms, instituted in New Spain in the late
eighteenth century, were intended to increase state efficiency.
These policies led to a general increase in prosperity throughout
the Empire (Lang 1975) and in New Mexico. Subsequent Indian
policy aimed at: (1) pursuit of peace iii order to increase revenues;
(2) use of frontier bands as buffers against foreign intrusion; and
(3) lowering the cost of administration and defense. These goals
gave rise to four strategies to control nomadic groups. First was
the use of "gifts" to engender dependency upon Spaniards. Second, divide-and-conquer strategies were used to pit one group
against other hostile groups. T h i r d , nomadic groups were
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol24/iss24/5
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pressed to form more centralized political structures, which gave
rise to the "tribes" we know today. Fourth, the frontier provinces
were reorganized, a line of forts was constructed, and highly
mobile "flying companies" were used to control hostile nomads
(Moorhead 1968,1975; Griffen 1983a, 1983b, 1984,1985; T h r a p p
1967).18
American influence in the Southwest dates to the opening of
the Santa Fe Trail in 1821. As trade increased, New Mexico became more strongly oriented toward the United States. T h e
Mexican-American war (1846-1848) resulted in the annexation of
the northern half of Mexico to the United States in 1848. California and Texas were the major goals of the conquest. New Mexico
(which then included modern Arizona) was primarily a "land
bridge" between California and Texas. Fighting with nomadic
groups increased until the American Civil War (1860-64), spurred by increasing traffic through nomad lands and increased
trade or encroachment on hunting territories. After the Civil War
"the American state began a major effort to control nomadic
groups throughout the west (Utley 1984). T h e Comanche bands
became a major internal nuisance instead of a buffer-border patrol. A major effort was mounted to force them, and subsequently
the Apache bands, onto very limited reservation territories.
Comanches declined from "Lords of the South Plains" (Wallace
and Hoebel 1952) to a handful of reservation dwellers (from between 20,000 and 30,000 in the early nineteenth century to between 1,000 and 2,000 in the late nineteenth century [Hall 1986,
1989]). Their territory shrank from the western half of Texas to a
small reservation in Oklahoma (Indian Territory). They had become a barrier to internal trade in the United States, and their
major resource, the buffalo, had become very scarce.
Apache groups fared better. Centuries of a "raiding mode of
production" had perfected their survival techniques. Low interest
in New Mexico and Arizona led to considerably lower pressure on
Apaches. A combination of eastern sentiments sympathetic to the
"vanishing red man," and lucrative contracts to be had for supplying first the army and later reservations, prevented complete
genocide.
Thus, the American state succeeded in accomplishing in less
than fifty years what Spanish administrators had not been able to
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1991
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accomplish in nearly two hundred and fifty years—total sedentarizadon of nomadic groups.
Discussion and Conclusions
What, then do these brief cases suggest about the roles of
nomads in civilizational change and the historical evolution of
core/periphery hierarchies? I begin with some general remarks,
then turn to some more specific conclusions.
While it is clear that I have not sampled the entire range of
nomad-sedentary relations (for instance, there is no examination
of wholly nomadic settings as a limiting case, nor of very early,
pre-horse, nomad-sedentary relations), still, a tentative, schematic account of the role of nomads in the historical evolution of
core/periphery hierarchies is discernible. This sketch is not intended as a definitive statement, but as an elaborate working
hypothesis useful for guiding further research.
Once states domesticated horses and mastered the production
and use of iron, they more commonly took the core role in core/
periphery hierarchies, giving rise to other states, and unleashing
interstate competition and expanding territorially. 17 Expansion
necessarily led to contact with, and frequently incorporation of,
new groups into a core/periphery hierarchy.
As with Comanches, incorporation of new territories and
peoples may promote social changes which produce more effective resistance and more formidable enemies on the frontier of
civilization (Hall 1989; Gailey and Patterson 1987 1988). Hence,
"civilization gave birth to barbarism" (Lattimore 1962d, p. 99,
cited in Wallerstein 1974b, p. 98). Even the preceding brief account of Central Asian nomads indicates that, as with early
marcher states (Chase-Dunn 1988), such "barbarians," once engendered by adjacent states, could become relatively autonomous
sources of social change.
When the degree of technological difference between nomad
and sedentary populations was low, as it was in the early stages of
the agrarian era (3,000 to 1,000 B.C., + / - 1,000 years), which
group would dominate a core/periphery hierarchy was an open
issue. Since stationary targets are easier to attack than mobile
ones, nomads could readily defeat sedentary groups. Sedentary
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agriculturalists could be forced to pay tribute or used as slaves.
Since the wealth of nomads—usually in the form of animals—is
mobile, they could avoid paying tribute. Conversely, they were
inimical to sedentary life and difficult to make into slaves.
However, nomads could be induced into trade relations.
Sedentary peoples typically have some surplus agricultural products, but a shortage of meat and/or horses. Nomads typically have
a surplus of meat in the form of animals, but a shortage of vegetable and other resources. Thus, there is opportunity for trade.
Where the terms of trade were not suitable, or where sedentary
people were unwilling to trade, raiding became an alternative
form of exchange. The Mongols perfected the threat (and use) of
violence as a tool for improving the terms of trade.
Where large distances separated different states or core/
periphery hierarchies, nomads could become middlemen in
trade based on their superior mobility and superior knowledge of
the "uncivilized" territory, as was the case for Central Asian
nomads and for Comanches under the Spanish empire. When
they could not be middlemen, nomads could either raid or extract
"protection rent" (Lane 1973; Chase-Dunn 1989). Even in the case
of strong states, nomads could maintain a considerable degree of
autonomy if they could play one state against the other (Barfield
in press, b). The many ways in which state systems dealt with
nomads, in turn, shape their own administrative, political, and
trade systems, as was clearly the case for both China and the
Spanish empire.
Several more-or-less reasonable conclusions emerge from this
discussion. First, formal systems (bureaucracies, in short, states)
have a very difficult time dealing with informal, or acephalous,
societies. This is true whether it is the Aztecs dealing with the
"Chichimecas" (McGuire 1980, 1986; Mathien and McGuire
1986), the Romans dealing with Germanic and other "tribes"
(Luttwak 1976; Dyson 1985), the Chinese dealing with Mongols or
Turks, the Byzantine empire dealing with Turks and others
(Lindner 1983), the Spanish empire dealing with "los Indios barbaros," or the United States dealing with various Native American
"tribes" (Hall 1989; Utley 1984).
Second, nomads occasionally conquer states, but cannot rule
them (for long) without becoming sedentarized. "As the Chinese
pithily expressed it long ago, an empire could be conquered on
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horseback, but not ruled from horseback" (Lattimore 1962b, p.
508). Comparison of the Chinese, Mongol, and Ottoman empires
underscores this argument: empires require a sedentary base.
Even the Mongols built a capital city, Karakorum.
However, under special circumstances nomads can extract
some tribute from sedentary states. The outer frontier strategy of
Central Asian nomads is such a case. The outer frontier strategy
was not a monopoly of the Mongols. Nomadic Indians in the
American Southwest, especially Comanches, were also adept at
extracting tribute from the Spanish Empire. Assessment as to
whether "gifts" from sedentary rulers to nomadic clients constitutes tribute or "trinkets" is a complicated matter. Relative worth
is a significant component of the assessment. What may have been
"mere trinkets" to state officials, may have been vital prestige
goods to nomads. Evaluation of relative worth is not facilitated by
the nearly universal tendency of contemporary writers (almost all
from sedentary societies) to gloss such gifts as trinkets, even when
the cost of those "trinkets" was bankrupting the state treasury.
Third, qualitative aspects of nomad-sedentary relations have
shifted through time. T h e effect of nomads on states has lessened
t h r o u g h t i m e , while the e f f e c t of states on n o m a d s has
strengthened through time. This trend is due, at least in part, to a
growing technological gulf between nomadic and sedentary
populations. Thus, while relative dependency may be problematic for the Bronze Age, it becomes less problematic after the appearance of mounted pastoralists in Central Asia, and entirely
clear by the seventeenth century of the Christian era.
These conclusions easily give rise to as many questions as they
answer, and suggest a number of continuing research problems.
The profound social changes that accompany changes in transportation technology suggest parallels between the nomadsedentary distinction and the overland-maritime distinction
elaborated by Edward Fox. 18 Horses, like ships, enhance communication over broad, trackless areas. Nomads were important
in the diffusion of ideas, technologies, and diseases. They transmitted the plagues to both Europe and China (McNeill 1976).
As with ships, horses do not readily facilitate amassing permanent, large armies. Horses and ships do, however, permit sizable
temporary amassings for rapid attacks. A key feature of nomadic
empires, like maritime states, is their relative fragility and instabilhttps://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol24/iss24/5
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ity as compared with agrarian states and empires. The major
differences seem to be that horses can be produced on the trackless area, where ships must be built on land; while ships facilitate
bulk trade, horses (and camels and mules) are better used for
(relative) luxury goods.
T h e inner and outer frontier strategies can be seen as strategies
for advancement. Semiperipheral players can be either sources of
stability or instability. This parallel warrants further examination.
Is the semiperipheral social position always a locus of change?
Does the role, or set of possible roles, of the intermediate tiers of a
core/periphery hierarchy change systematically with the type of
core/periphery hierarchy? Do the roles change with the type of
social unit (sedentary, nomad, state, nonstate) occupying the position?
Whatever the answers to these questions, the evidence appears
to be compelling that the study of social change must focus on
core/periphery hierarchies and not on individual components
(states, tribes, etc.) of the hierarchy. Within the hierarchy
peripheral, and especially semiperipheral, units play highly variable roles, especially nomadic groups. The habit of pushing barbarians beyond the pale—a military and political goal that was
seldom achieved by any empire for any significant period of
time—is for intellectual pursuits at best misleading, and potentially disastrous for understanding civilizational change.
De Pauw University
NOTES
1. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 1988 a n d 1989
ISCSC meetings, a n d at the 1990 International Studies Association meeting. Discussions with many members of ISCSC helped improve the argument. T h e i r efforts led to many improvements. T h e editorial comments of Wayne Bledsoe also sharpened the presentation. As is usual in
such cases these people are not to be blamed for my refusal to take their
advice.
2. Wallerstein's world-system theory is developed in the following publications, Wallerstein (1974a, 1974b, 1979, 1980, 1984, 1989, 1990).
3. Chase-Dunn (1988, 1990b) argues that change often originates in
the "semiperiphery," in marcher states. Kohl (1987b) makes a similar
a r g u m e n t for Bronze Age South Central Asia. T h e a r g u m e n t that
change frequently originates in fringe areas (semiperiphery or even
periphery) has a long pedigree. Service (1975) sees evolution of civiliza-
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tions coming primarily from outside forces. Teggart (1918,1925) argued
that major sources of change are contacts between groups. Champion
(1989, p. 10) and Strassoldo (1989, pp. 47-48) trace this argument to
Toynbee and Sorokin. This suggests yet another way nomads may be
important in civilizational change.
4. Shannon (1989) provides a thorough introduction to this immense
literature. Chase-Dunn (1989) presents the single best summary of it.
5. This extension of world-system theory parallels the general analysis
of "center-periphery" relations in geography and political science
(Gottmann 1980; Smith 1976, 1987; Strassoldo 1980), yet preserves
world-system theory's key feature: the system itself is the basic unit of
analysis (Bach 1980; Hopkins 1978,1979; Hopkins and Wallerstein 1981,
1982). Many writers explicitly address the issue of "precapitalist" worldsystems: Abu-Lughod (1987, 1989, 1990), Chase-Dunn (1988, 1989,
1990a), Chase-Dunn and Hall (1991a, 1991b), Gailey (1985), Gledhill
(1988), and Kohl (1985, 1987a, 1987b, 1988).
6. Champion (1989, p. 8) builds on Schneider's critique (1977) of Wallerstein's emphasis on bulk or utilitarian goods as opposed to luxury
goods, to argue that there is really a continuum of types of goods. T h e
importance of the trade lies not in the goods themselves, but the social
uses to which they are put. Rowlands (1987) makes a similar argument.
McGuire (1989) presents an intriguing case supporting this interpretation.
7. T h e point of this admittedly infelicitous term is that it emphasizes
some sort of ranked relationship between the center (core) and the
fringes (periphery) without entailing all the theoretical assumptions
made by Wallerstein. By dropping the "world" the confusion between a
self-contained division of labor and domination of the globe is eliminated.
8. See accounts by Barfield (1989), Eberhard (1965,1977), Elvin (1973),
Jagchid and Symons (1989), Kwanten (1979), Lattimore (1951, 1962c,
1980), Szynkiewicz (1989).
9. Barfield (in press, a) compares Central Asian and Middle Eastern
nomads and finds this to be a key difference between them that explains
why Central Asian nomads frequently conquered sedentary states, and
Middle Eastern nomads did not. T h e iatter did not have a clan structure
which easily facilitated the building of larger and larger alliances.
10. According to Allsen (1987), Mongke was able to implement administrative innovations by keeping conservatives occupied in (successful) battles giving him a free hand in the center. As Lindner (1981, 1983)
notes, this is N O T a reversion to "great man theory" of history. Rather, it
is a recognition that "tribal" systems are "big man" systems (Sahlins 1961,
1963, 1968), and hence are strongly affected by a "great," "big man"!
11. See Barth (1969) on this, even though his studies are more or less
contemporary, it is clear in Lindner (1981, 1982, 1983), Lattimore (1951,
1962c) and others that fluidity of membership and permeability of boundaries are the essences of pastoralism.
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12. See Hodgson (1974, Book Five) for a summary of the massive
changes brought about by the use of g u n p o w d e r t h r o u g h o u t Eurasia.
13. Only minimal references f o r this discussion will be given here.
Fuller documentation can be f o u n d in Hall (1986, 1989).
14. T h e r e is an important debate thinly hidden here over the nature
and origin of capitalism. Whether capitalism became a dominant mode
of production in the sixteenth century as Wallerstein argues, or much
later as others argue. This debate is more than terminological, but for
present purposes is not germane. Wolf (1982, Chap. 1) and Hall (1989,
Chap. 2) summarize the issues a n d literature.
15. An important sociological point is often masked by writing conventions. When the term, "the Comanches" is used in conveys a sense of a
unitary g r o u p which is historically false. Hence, in this account, and in
Hall (1989) I use the terms, "Comanches" (without the article "the") or
"the Comanche bands" to convey a non-unitary political organization.
This also applies to "Apaches," who did remain f r a g m e n t e d in to several
"tribes."
16. Flying companies are quite old. Luttwak (1976) describes how the
Romans used them and Lattimore (1962a, p. 485) discusses their use by
the Chinese.
17. See Chase-Dunn (1989, 1990a) and Wilkinson (1983, 1987, 1988a,
1988b) for elaborate discussions of the various forms of competition.
18. This distinction was developed by Edward Fox (1971, 1989), a n d
elaborated by Hochberg (1985), Genovese and Hochberg (1989), a n d
Tilly (1989).
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